Hastings Law Journal
Volume 46 | Issue 4

1-1995

Comment: Congressional Powers and Federal
Judicial Burdens
Dennis E. Curtis

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dennis E. Curtis, Comment: Congressional Powers and Federal Judicial Burdens, 46 Hastings L.J. 1019 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol46/iss4/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Article 4

Comment: Congressional Powers and
Federal Judicial Burdens
by
DENms E. GuRRns*

Professor Beale's Article, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the ProperLimits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction,is
a well-documented plea for the conservation of federal judicial resources in the face of a burgeoning criminal caseload, caused at least
in part by the creation of new federal crimes. The "too many" in the
title of Professor Beale's Article refers to the current plethora of federal criminal cases that threaten (in the view of many) a docket crisis
in the federal courts. The "too few" refers to the ability of federal
prosecutors to pursue only a small fraction of the cases that could be
prosecuted under federal law. Moreover, these "too few" cases are
generally identical to cases that are prosecuted in state courts, thus
raising the question of the utility of federal prosecutions.
Professor Beale develops a strong argument that the current system of concurrent federal/state criminal jurisdiction is "deeply problematic." First, given that federal sentences are generally harsher than
state sentences for identical criminal conduct, the offenders who are
prosecuted in federal court can receive grossly disparate sentences.
Professor Beale rightly calls this an unfair "structural defect" that directly contradicts the policy behind the federal guideline sentencing
scheme, which calls for like sentences for similarly situated individuals
who commit comparable offenses.1
Second, the current system imposes a burden on the relatively
small federal judicial system. As Professor Beale (and some federal
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. My thanks to
Judith Resnik and Rory Little, whose work I have long admired.
1. Professor Beale seems to assume (as do I) that the unfairness stems from the
phenomenon of giving the few (federal) offenders very harsh sentences in comparison to
those received by the many (state) offenders for similar crimes. I believe that the current
system is unfair because I think that federal sentences are, in general, excessive with respect to any of the usual purposes of sentencing-punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation,
or incapacitation. On the other hand, I must admit that there are people who have different views, and some of them are in Congress. We who criticize the current dual system
must make it clear that we are prepared to argue that it is the federal punishment system
that is out of line and that state prisoners are not getting undeserved breaks.
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judges) perceives the problem, 2 the workload of federal judges threatens to impair the quality of justice delivered in criminal cases and to
decrease the ability of the federal courts to perform their "constitutional" functions in civil cases.
Third, Professor Beale believes that there is a tension between
the current system and decentralization, which she believes to be a
desirable attribute of federalism. Professor Beale links decentralization with federalist values of efficiency and experimentation. She also
notes that decentralization permits criminal justice policy to be tailored to local conditions and varying policy preferences.
Professor Beale suggests that Congress uncouple two components
of federal criminal jurisdiction-the need for federal jurisdiction and
the need to employ federal judicial resources. Professor Beale believes that any theory that bases jurisdiction on the need for federal
resources will inevitably produce more cases than can "fit comfortably
within the small federal judicial system." Hence, Congress might better devote resources to fighting crime by: (1) supplementing state and
local law enforcement resources; (2) authorizing federal prosecutors
and investigators to help prepare state cases; or (3) creating federal
crimes, with federal penalties, to be tried in state courts. None of
these choices would impinge upon federal judicial resources and
would, thus, free federal judges to concentrate on matters of "clear
and interest that properly fall within the scope of fednational import
'3
eral concern."
Even if Congress adopted the approaches described above, Professor Beale believes that some structuring of prosecutorial discretion
would still be necessary to prevent overburdening of federal judicial
resources and to avoid unfairness to defendants. She proposes that
prosecutorial discretion be exercised on a class basis rather than the
current ad hoc method and that some entity, either Congress or the
Department of Justice, promulgate prosecutorial standards that are
public and enforceable. She would require the standards to be "sufficiently definite and quantifiable to ensure that the current ad hoc decision making would not appear in a new guise."
2. See generally COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1994); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY]; Hon. Roger J. Miner, The Consequences of FederalizingCriminal
Law: Overloaded Courts and a DissatisfiedPublic, CraM. JUST., Spring 1989, at 16; Hon.
William H. Rehnquist, 1993 Year-End Report on the State of the Judiciary,reprintedin THE
THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1993, at 1 ("[W]e can no
longer afford the luxury of state and federal courts that work at cross purposes or irrationally duplicate one another.").
3. Professor Beale quotes here from the COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 13, 16 (Draft for Public Comment, Nov. 1994).
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Let me begin my commentary by agreeing with and appreciating
Professor Beale's effort to "disaggregate" the concept of federalization: we should discuss the opportunities and effects of federalization
in the context of the three different branches of the federal government. I also agree that, for example, Congress could provide federal
resources, indeed a federal cause of action, without necessarily involving either federal prosecutors or the federal courts.
Further, Professor Beale fairly points out that, under the current
form of federalization, a disproportionate part of the burden of implementation of the congressional vision falls upon the federal courts.
The number of criminal statutes has increased, and the number of
prosecutors has increased. Resources committed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other enforcement agencies have
increased. Yet the number of federal judges available to hear and
handle cases has not risen to keep pace with the increase in federal
resources devoted to investigation and prosecution of crime.
While the pressure on judicial resources has received the attention, I must add that other resources within the federal system are
equally-or more-stressed. The allocation of resources to federal
public defenders has not kept pace, 4 and those private lawyers who
are appointed as criminal defense lawyers have described the burdens
imposed upon them by the delay in receiving payments. 5
In short, Professor Beale has rightly pointed to court congestion,
duplication of resources, and unfairness to defendants as serious
problems that are intrinsic to the current criminal justice "nonsystem." I do, however, part company with her in two important respects: in her analysis of why federalization is a problem and in at
least one of her proposed solutions-prosecution of federal crimes in
state courts. I think that Professor Beale's focus on the federal judiciary addresses only a part of the conversation that is necessary when
considering the role that Congress should play in creating federal
crimes. Hence, let me set forth the analytic premises from whence I
begin.
I take the history that state courts predated the federal courts as a
given. I also accept the fact that Article III authorizes Congress to
give federal courts jurisdiction as a structural premise-Congress has
the constitutional power to provide federal courts with jurisdiction,
4. For the period 1979-1990, the percentage change in direct expenditures for federal
public defense purposes was 68.9%, while that for prosecution and legal services was
470.4%. For the period covering 1985-1990, the respective percentages are 18.2% and
88.9%. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTCE, BURLEAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CIMINAL JusTIcE STATISTICS 1993, at 3 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds., 1994).
5. See, e.g., Report of the Committee to Review the CriminalJustice Act, CRIM.L.
REP. (BNA) No. 52, at 2265 (Mar. 10, 1993).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

bounded only by the limits of Article III. Given those two background assumptions-the states were here first, and Congress has constitutional power to give federal courts jurisdiction-the question is
when and how Congress should act. In facing that question, I also
assume that the states have already proscribed most of the behavior
that is now also prohibited by federal criminal law. Given the undoubted power of Congress, the discussion is rarely couched in constitutional terms. 6 Most of the time, the question concerns when
Congress should legislate criminally. One argument is that permission
for Congress to make something criminal under federal law should
come from history: if Congress has acted before, it may do so again.
But as a limiting principle, that approach is not very useful. The
catalog of federal crimes is huge, over three thousand offenses are on
the books. The other papers from this Symposium demonstrate that
Congress has acted time and again to criminalize actions that are already forbidden by state law. The only reason today we conceptualize
''crime x" as federal and "crime y" as state is because of a pattern of
congressional action. For example, why should robbing a bank be
seen as a "federal" concern? Answer: Congress said so a long time
ago. 7 History tells us, as a descriptive matter, what Congress has
done, but it cannot tell us what Congress should do. The bottom line:
laws making various crimes federal ofCongress's readiness to pass
8
fenses is almost unlimited.
Given that a priorilittle is "intrinsically" state or federal but that
historically state courts have had broader jurisdiction than the federal
courts, we then move from the question of when Congress may act to
the question of why Congress might pass legislation making certain
behavior a federal crime. Again, the permissible bases seem to be
almost unlimited.
First, of course, there are "federal" crimes-e.g., crimes against
9
the United States itself, such as treason or income tax violations.
6. Though in a recent and possibly far-reaching decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit
guns within 1,000 feet of a school. See United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 3039 (U.S., Apr. 26, 1995).
7. See Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization,in this Symposium Issue; Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. RIv. 545,
548-55 (1925).
8. The United States Supreme Court's readiness to countenance such decisions is no
longer clear. See United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039 (U.S., Apr.
26, 1995).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988)(treason); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988)(income tax violations). My favorite federal crimes include: 18 U.S.C. § 46 (1988) (transporting water hyacinths); 18 U.S.C. § 709 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (misuse of the "Smoky Bear" character or
name); and 18 U.S.C. § 707 (1988) (fraudulent use of a 4-H club emblem).
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Second, Congress could take a behavior heretofore legal and
make it criminal. Examples include prohibition of the sale of alcohol,
which was once legal, then criminally prohibited, now again legal.
Third, Congress could make a federal crime if it wants to draw
national attention to a problem. I take it that the recently enacted
Violence Against Women Act is an example of this rationale. Making
something a proverbial "federal case" is one way to help us all see that
so-called "domestic" violence is not a normal family scene, but a nationally prevalent behavior that concerns everyone.
Fourth, Congress could make something a federal crime if it
wanted a uniform enforcement policy; here with more ifs-if one
could compel U.S. Attorney's offices around the country to follow
uniform rules; if Congress devoted enough resources to enable U.S.
Attorneys to bring all or most cases; and, if one assumes that the
states will not do interstate cooperative national work.
Fifth, Congress could make something a federal crime if it
thought that it could put certain kinds of resources to work at responding, and if it believed in either economies of scale (given the size
of the country) or in targeted work against crimes that are serious but
committed relatively infrequently. For example, federal efforts to
combat violence against abortion clinics could be prosecuted by a relatively small task force, but might involve almost simultaneous indictments in Buffalo, San Diego, Wichita, and Brookline. Congress could
also use federal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that states would not
prosecute-for example, perhaps Congress might believe that states
were lax in dealing with political corruption and, therefore, devote
resources to that effort.
Sixth, Congress could decide to make something a federal crime
if it thought that a national agency, such as the FBI, was the right
entity to do investigation, and that the FBI should have exclusive investigative responsibilities without sharing information or cooperating
with state authorities. Again, political corruption could be a target of
this sort of legislation.
Seventh, Congress could make criminal activity subject to specific
penalties: imagine that Congress wanted to change sentencing policy
to make it more harsh or more lenient. Congress could decide to
prosecute, for example, all cocaine cases and impose federal guideline
sentences upon all offenders. Alternatively, as Professor Beale suggests, one piece of national legislation could change state penalty
structures to conform to federal sentencing laws. I am somewhat dubious about Congress's power to accomplish the latter aim;10 nevertheless, it remains a possibility.
10. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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Finally, Congress could make something a crime simply because
it was popular to do so: imagine a hue and cry against guns, with
Congress stepping in to make it criminal to own a gun.
I take all of the above rationales-not an exhaustive list, and not
all presumptively wise-to be permissible bases for federal criminal
jurisdiction, both constitutionally and more than plausibly. I think
that Professor Beale would agree. Where I part company with her is
in her narrow focus on judicial workload as the primary limiting factor
in determining which and how many cases should be handled by the
federal courts. The problem with workload as a limiting principle is
that it does not deal with the complex questions that are presented
when Congress adopts one of the rationales listed above.
A good deal of Professor Beale's assumptions proceed from the
proposition that making too many federal crimes is bad for federal
judges, who will have too much work to do. But assume that Congress
decides that one of the above rationales is so important that it is prepared to devote the resources necessary to deal with the problem, including increasing the number of federal judges to deal with the
increased caseload. I am sympathetic with concerns about workloads,
but much less sympathetic with the claim that a federal judiciary of
1,300 people (including magistrate judges, very relevant in the criminal context) is sufficient to the needs of a country of more than
200,000 million people.
First, I believe that the arguments based on the "character" of the
federal judiciary are misplaced. Professor Beale adopts the view (embodied in the 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee Report) that increasing the number of federal judges would cause a "significant
dilution of the prestige and responsibility that have historically served
as the chief incentives permitting the recruitment of persons of real
distinction." Every lawyer who practices in federal court knows that
for every sitting federal judge there are at least ten (and probably
many more) equally qualified lawyers available in every judicial district. Second, federal judges are not "carefully selected from a pool of
competent and eager applicants," but gain appointment through a
complicated political process that screens out many who would be
"competent and eager applicants" if they had a chance to be
nominated.
Most importantly, someone appointed to be a federal judge-and
to wield truly awesome power-would do her or his level best to use
that power responsibly, whether as a member of a cadre of 1,000 or
2,000 judges. Whether a person behaves responsibly or feels like a
"tiny cog in a vast wheel"'1 and, thus, neglects his or her duties is, in
my view, a function of character and life experience, not a variable
11.

FEDERAL COURTS STUDY,

supra note 2, at 9.
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dependent upon the relative prestige of the office. It is hard for me to
believe that any judge would not "feel a personal stake in the consequences of [his or her] actions." 12 Judges, above all, deal with people
and make decisions crucial to peoples' lives. Perhaps some forms of
assembly line justice can deaden a judge's personal feelings about the
consequences of his or her actions, but such conditions surely would
not obtain in even a greatly enlarged federal court system.
In light of her conception of the problem-the burden on federal
judges-Professor Beale has offered one kind of disaggregation:
think about federal prosecutions separate from federal judges. Of
equal import is another form of disaggregation: what is the rationale
behind congressional criminal law making? Unless you pick your
goal-any of the ones listed above-you cannot figure out who should
be responsible for implementation and why. Moreover, the goal
should not be to protect federal judges. In summary, I can agree with
Professor Beale that the current system is bad (for several reasons,
such as the ad hoc nature of federal prosecutorial decisions, the ineffective impact of federal prosecutions generally, the coercive and unfair effects of dual jurisdiction on defendants who end up in the
federal system) and yet disagree that the elite character of the federal
courts will only be preserved if we retain the current, or a slightly
13
increased, number of judges.
Let me turn then to Professor Beale's proposed solutions-specifically the transfer of some of the criminal caseload from federal
courts to state courts. Let us remember, first, that both federal and
state judges are currently beleaguered by large criminal dockets and
that state judges, by and large, operate with many fewer resources
than do federal judges. Any solution to dual jurisdiction must take
into account very limited state resources. Professor Beale offers two
mechanisms to accomplish the transfer of cases to relieve the federal
criminal docket. The first is for Congress simply to provide resources
to the states to enforce those criminal laws that Congress believes deserve specific federal interest and national attention. Congress could
provide resources to states for prosecution of drug or firearms offenses, for example, and cease federal prosecution of those offenses.
Such a plan could take some of the pressure off of federal courts
and, given the random nature of the federal prosecutorial decisionmaking process in these cases-especially in drug cases-such a plan
could be reasonable. But it is not clear that, having transferred all
drug cases to the states, the federal criminal docket would necessarily
be reduced. For example, Congress could reasonably decide to in12. Id.
13. See Hon. Stephen . Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J.,
Jan.
1993, at 52."
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crease enforcement of other crimes-for example, mail fraud cases
involving significant sums of money-leaving the federal caseload at
the same level. More practically, United States Attorneys might very
well simply shift their attention to increased levels of enforcement of
other crimes across the board. Of course, if the shift in funding from
federal to state was accompanied by a corresponding reduction in federal prosecutorial resources, real reductions in the federal criminal
caseload could result.
There are other hard decisions associated with turning over complete jurisdiction over certain crimes to the states. Take drug prosecutions: federal prosecutions amount to about ten percent of the total of
these prosecutions nationwide-a significant number. Should Congress give the states enough money to make up for the lost ten percent? More? Less? Should Congress pay for relieving the additional
overcrowding of state prisons already bursting at the seams? Or, since
states already have criminalized the behavior, should Congress declare victory in the drug war and give the states nothing? One congressional purpose underlying the provision of federal resources to the
states might be to encourage the states to adopt harsher penalties or
uniform penalties-of whatever kind, harsh or lenient. If Congress's
money comes with strings attached-minimum sentences, for example-how have the values of federalism that Professor Beale appreciates, such as decentralized experimentation, been enhanced?
Professor Beale's other proposal is for Congress to give jurisdiction over federal crimes to state courts. She points to possible constitutional problems in the implementation of this proposal but argues
that there are no insuperable barriers to state court prosecution of
federal crimes. But, assuming for the moment its constitutionality, is
such a delegation really necessary? Most federal crimes could be
prosecuted as state crimes in state courts anyway. Why have dual jurisdictional bases for prosecution of the same behavior within a single
state?
Once again, this sort of delegation could be a de facto mechanism
by which Congress could not only give jurisdiction, but also impose
federal sentencing policy-again, making the national decision (presumably to be harsher) without doing much by way of putting national
assistance (funds for prisons, if nothing else) behind the policy. Further, if Professor Beale's first proposal (direct aid to states for enforcement of state law) were implemented, there is probably no need
to do more. If the overriding purpose of shifting cases is seen only as
a device to reduce the caseload of overburdened federal judges, that
palliative only transfers cases to courts with fewer resources and even
greater caseloads, probably makes for harsher criminal penalties, and
swells already overcrowded state prisons. There is another less attractive possibility. One could see Congress responding by passing
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"tough" legislation-proving itself "hard" on crime by both adding
prohibitions and upping penalties-but then handing all the problems
of enforcement over to the state courts, which are tremendously burdened already.
On the other hand, Professor Beale's third proposal-a call for
administrative regulations governing the decision to prosecute,
promulgated either by Congress or by the Department of Justicesounds a welcome note and, if implemented, might change significantly the caseload mix in the federal courts. I must point out two
problems: (1) although the mix might change, the burden on federal
judges could very well remain the same because realigning
prosecutorial discretion might not reduce the caseload or the workload of federal judges; and, more important, (2) I believe Professor
Beale's suggestion will be very difficult to implement given the discretionary decisions made not only by prosecutors but by investigators
and many low visibility actors along the chain that makes
prosecutorial decisions.
Assuming that the task of promulgating administrative regulations would fall upon the Attorney General, there are at least two
serious questions to ask about the ability of the Attorney General to
constrain charging decisions by individual U.S. Attorneys. First,
United States Attorneys have a long history of at least some independence from Washington. Moreover, some U.S. Attorneys are powerful political players in their own right, jealous of their independence
and confident of their own prosecutorial agenda. Second, courts have
in the past been exceedingly reluctant to circumscribe the discretion
of federal prosecutors either in charging or in plea bargaining.' 4 The
weight of historical practice, then, would make change difficult. Apart
from the questions of political feasibility, there is some doubt whether
any charging regulations can be effectively enforced by defendants,
which in my opinion is the only way in which such regulations could
be both effective and fair. It is one thing to draft regulations, quite
another to give a defendant indicted in federal court the right to have
the Dethe indictment quashed by a federal judge on the ground that
5
partment's charging regulations have not been followed.'
14. See e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The creation of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines has actually served to increase prosecutorial discretion while decreasing discretion on the part of the judiciary. See Dennis E. Curtis, Mistretta and Metaphor,66 S. CA. L. REv. 607 (1992); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the
Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1471, 1505-18 (1993).
15. The Justice Department's internal policies (such as the Petite Policy that governs
when the federal government will prosecute a defendant who has already been prosecuted
in state court) have been held not to create any substantive rights for defendants. See
United States v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pungitore,
910 F.2d 1084, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990); Katherine Lowe, ProsecutorialDiscretion, Twenty-Sec-
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Yet, despite my misgivings, I believe that there are some signs
that comprehensive Department of Justice charging regulations are
necessary and could be effective. First, Professor Beale and others are
clearly correct in pointing out the serious problems with federal law
enforcement case selection under the current system. Federal drug
laws, for example, have not resulted in the prosecution of only "kingpins" or large-scale drug dealers. Far from it. There is a very large
overlap of the categories of drug offenders prosecuted in state and
federal courts. Recognition of this reality should provide an impetus
toward structuring federal prosecutorial discretion, with a focus on
those cases where federal help is really needed.
Professor Beale is surely right that Congress's current policy (or
non-policy, to be more accurate) promotes the worst of alternatives:
random enforcement or non-enforcement of federal criminal laws,
minimal impact of federal prosecutions over a broad range of criminal
conduct, and disparate and harsher punishment in the relatively few
instances when federal prosecutions are brought. But the answer is
not to elevate federal judicial caseload as the main problem to be addressed. The discussion should be focused on when and how Congress
is best advised to spend federal resources (judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, prisons, investigators) and when Congress should be
advised to conserve such resources. Further, we should be clear
about what goals and values we are espousing: fairness to defendants? fair and appropriate sentencing? increased crime control? federalism? protecting federal judges? Naming the problem tends to
drive the solutions.

ond Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appea4 1991-92, 81 GEO. L.J. 1029, 1040 (1993).

